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A PURPOSELESS EFFORT: EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY AND CROATIAN SERBS
Stjepan BEKAVAC*
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In this paper, the authors analyze the relation of the international community 
(the European Community) to the minority legislation of Republic of Croa-
tia in 1991-1992. Namely, establishing beyond any doubt and evaluating the 
reasons why the Yugoslavia Peace Conference or the special institution, which 
the European Community formed in order to find a peaceful solution of the 
conflict, pressed Zagreb so strongly to make profound changes to the minority 
legislation. Special attention is given to the Conference’s fixation on the special 
status or regional political autonomy for the territories of Republic of Croatia 
with Serbian majority. 
Key Words: the European Community, the Republic of Croatia, the Serbian 
Question, minorities. 
Introduction
Many excellent works have already been written about the ineffective poli-
cies of the international community regarding the wars in the territories of the 
new states that emerged from the disintegration of the communist Yugoslavia. 
Indeed, the intervention of international organizations such as the European 
Community (EC) and the United Nations (UN) or the most influential coun-
tries in the world and Europe (such as the US, Russia, Great Britain, France 
and Germany) could not prevent the conflict. With its inconsistent approach, 
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they further prolonged the conflict. The effect of the aforementioned was a 
long humanitarian crisis, followed by devastation that Europe had not seen 
since the end of World War II. It is certain that they rarely resorted to solu-
tions or projects, so it was immediately clear that they would not have much 
chance of success, which could be reconciled with the rich repertoire of inef-
ficiencies of the international community.
In the final moments of its presence in Yugoslavia (May 1990 – October 
1991), Croatia defined its relation towards the most populous minority, the 
Serbs, in applying the democratic principles grounded on international con-
ventions and standards. Even though the conventions and standards were not 
mentioned by name explicitly, the Serbs retained their rights and liberties as 
other Croatian citizens under the December 1990 Constitution.1 Moreover, 
having in mind their number and political peculiarity, the legislator secured 
their right to cultural autonomy and local self-government, affirmed in the 
Parliament of the Republic of Croatia at the end of June 1991.2 Nonetheless, 
one part of Croatian Serbs rebelled against the constitutional order of Croatia 
and with the help of the federal armed force (Yugoslav National Army) and 
Serbia, and succeeded in occupying approximately one quarter of the Croa-
tian territory by the autumn of 1991. Considering themselves as part of the 
all-Serbian state in the making, they broke off all connections with the Croa-
tian authorities, clearly demonstrating that they did not consider themselves 
Croatian citizens. 
Right in the moment of escalation of the armed conflict in Croatia, influ-
ential circles of some member states of the EC started to promote the idea of 
necessary changes to minority legislation as a means of its resolution. The pos-
sible reasons why the opinion of the Yugoslavia Peace Conference, as early as 
from the beginning of October 1991, stating that only “special status” regula-
tion for the territories with Serbian majority population in Croatia can lead to 
the peaceful solution will be discussed in more detail in the final remarks. In 
the beginning, the first task of the aforementioned conference was to establish 
a framework for the peaceful solution of the conflict based on the principles 
of unacceptable unilateral reshaping of republic borders (via force), protection 
of rights for everyone in Yugoslavia by taking into consideration all legitimate 
aspirations. Relating the second component, i.e. minority rights protection, 
special Work Group of the conference accepted the guidelines which antic-
ipated the right for all minorities to complete and uninterrupted protection, 
autonomous development and respect of their uniqueness, beginning with the 
1 Nikica Barić, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990 – 1995. [Serbian Rebellion in Croatia 1990-1995] 
(Zagreb: Golden marketing – Tehnička knjiga, 2005), pp. 88 – 90.
2 Željko Luburović, “Ulaznica za Evropu“ [„A Ticket to Europe“], Vjesnik, December 4, 1991.
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second half of September 1991. But, only a half-month later, at the beginning 
of October 1991, first the high representatives of the Conference along with 
participation of the Presidents of Croatia and Serbia, adopted the statement 
according to which political solution to the crises, eventually including the 
recognition of some republics, implicitly included suitable arrangements for 
the protection of minorities, including guarantees for human rights protec-
tion and eventually, special status for certain areas, only for the special status 
principle (for which the president of the conference, the Englishman Peter 
Carrington started to plead for in particular), in the second half of the same 
month, within special arrangements for the resolution of crises in general, , to 
become a separate part of entire peace proposition. Moreover, it was explicitly 
stated that it relates to the Serbs in Croatia specially. Here is the paragraph in 
full: 
“Special status. Besides this, the counties in which members of some national 
or ethnic group form a majority will enjoy a special status (autonomy). This 
status will secure: a) the right of possession and accentuation of national sym-
bols of the group; b) the right to another citizenship for the members of this 
group apart from the republic citizenship; c) an education system which re-
spects the values and necessities of that group; d) i) a legislative body, ii) an 
administrative structure, including the regional police force, iii) and judiciary, 
authorized for the legal questions of that county which reflects the population 
composition of that county; e) security of adequate international supervision. 
The aforementioned status will apply especially to the Serbs living in Croatia 
where they represent the majority.”3 
Resisting the “progressive pressure” – Constitutional Law of De-
cember 1991
This dramatic shift in the Conference’s attitude – a new opinion that exist-
ing regulations of the Croatian legislation on minority rights are insufficient 
and (because it does not mention the right to territorial autonomy), if Zagreb 
wants to gain international recognition, it must complement it significantly, 
and it was the platform upon which, as will be seen later on, Croatia adopted 
the new law on the minority communities status in the end. In other words, 
for Zagreb, the regulation regarding the special status – or de facto – regional 
3 Sonja Biserko, Saška Stanojlović (eds)., Poslednja šansa Jugoslavije: Haška konferencija 1991 
[Yugoslavia’s Last Chance: The 1991 Hague Conference] (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor Srbija, 2002.), p. 
110.
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territorial-political autonomy – was unacceptable for various reasons, especial-
ly, among others, the danger of introducing the elements of confederalism into 
the state structure (high degree of territorial autonomy, regional police and 
judiciary with authorities beyond the scope of central power and dual citizen-
ship). Therefore, the representatives of Croatia, faced with a growing pressure 
from the Conference leaders, endeavored in counterbalancing by warning of 
two fundamental facts. First of all, by pointing out that Croatia had already 
established sufficient legal framework for the protection of minorities, which 
implicated that additional pressure could not lead to the desired aim, which 
is peace. Croatia is willing to honor all human and “ethnic” rights of Serbs, 
including the right to cultural and local autonomy, as said by the Croatian 
president Franjo Tuđman to the request for “the call to make the first step”, so 
to say, in order to implement “the special legislation for territorial autonomy” 
on those areas where the Serbs are in majority, as the Dutch minister of foreign 
affairs Hans van den Broek told him on October 11, 1991.4 
As justified as it was, Tuđman’s argument could not be successful for the 
simple reason that Zagreb held a position of the weaker participant, i.e. the 
road to recognition was conditioned by the Conference’s consent, but one must 
bear in mind that the rebelled Serbs had not been interested at all in material-
izing any rights in Croatia. The second Zagreb argument had a more practical 
weight, simply because it relied on the inconsistency of the international medi-
ator itself. After the Conference soothed some views regarding the special sta-
tus up to a certain point (rejecting the precise definition of territories)5 at the 
end of October 1991, Tuđman declared, at the beginning of the next month, 
repeating his readiness to honor all minority rights, that Croatia is concurred 
with possibility of local self-government for territories with Serbian majority 
under condition the same principle applied to other territories in former Yugo-
slavia. Namely, he rejected to accept the local autonomy for Serbs in Croatia if, 
simultaneously, the same right was not provided for Albanians in Kosovo and 
Metohia, Muslims in Sanjak, Hungarians in Vojvodina and (partly unclear) 
for all the nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.6 If the international community 
persisted in resolving the conflict under the condition of securing the rights of 
minorities everywhere in former Yugoslavia, which the Conference represent-
4 Hrvatski državni arhiv (HDA) [Croatian State Archives], fond [Record Group] 1741, Ured 
Predsjednika Republike (UPRH) [Office of the President of the Republic] (Record Group’s Signa-
ture: HR-HDA-1741), Kraljevina Nizozemska/Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova [The Kingdom of the 
Netherlands/Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Letter, 11 October 1991.
5 Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and Minorities 
Working Group of the Conferences of Yugoslavia (Washington D. C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.), pp. 96 – 97.
6 HR-HDA-1741, Vrhovno državno vijeće [Supreme State Council], Zapisnik sa sastanka od 3. 
studenog 1991. [Minutes of 3 November 1991].
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atives proclaimed multiple times, then it could request additional concessions 
from Croatia only after obtaining the same rights for minorities elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, even this consistent argument did not lead to a change in the 
Conference’s attitude. On the contrary, amended peace proposition, published 
on November 4, 1991, kept the chapter on special status territories expelling 
the dual citizenship regulation, but adding the permanent demilitarization 
order. The proposition was rejected by the representatives of Serbia, Republic 
of Serbian Krajina and Albanians from Kosovo.7 
Showing that, in the middle of the general dependence on international 
recognition, Zagreb was not immune to the threat of open blackmail, and 
Croatia accepted the proposition under visible pressure in the end. To convey 
a clear message after all, as a result of understandable disapproval, the German 
chancellor Hans-Dietrich Genscher sent a message to Tuđman on November 
12, 1991 in which he stated that by mid-December of the same year, Croatia is 
expected to proclaim a special law on minority rights, which will completely 
fulfill the requirement of the aforementioned amended peace proposal from 
the start of November, including the special territories regulation. Moreover, 
Zagreb had to grant “special autonomous status” for those municipalities with 
Serbian majority and consent to demilitarization and international supervi-
sion. Zagreb could not hope for the reciprocity principle, i.e. establishment of 
the same level of protection for minorities everywhere else in the former Yu-
goslavia. As Genscher especially stated: “The question of rights of Albanians in 
Kosovo should be settled between Serbia and Europe”. From Croatia, for which 
the president of Conference had to be particularly informed, “constructive 
cooperation” was expected.8 Thus German strong effort for the recognition of 
Croatia was conditioned by the consent for profound changes in the contents 
of the existing minority legislation. 
Nevertheless, the numerous possibilities for resistance which Zagreb had 
at its disposal were not exhausted. In short, the Croatian government, insti-
tution whose own task force drafted the bill of constitutional law and which 
became its proposer, decided to suggest to the Parliament of the Republic of 
Croatia (Croatian Diet or Parliament) the incorporation of municipalities with 
special self-governmental or autonomous status with the right to regional inte-
gration in the end after all (where Serbs made absolute majority of population, 
i.e. municipalities of Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac, Gračac, Titova Korenica, Donji 
Lapac, Glina, Vrginmost, Hrvatska Kostajnica, Dvor na Uni and Vojnić), for 
7 S. Biserko, S. Stanojlović (eds)., Poslednja šansa Jugoslavije: Haška konferencija 1991, pp. 139 – 
140.
8 HR-HDA-1741, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Poruka od 12. studenog 1991. [The message of No-
vember 12, 1991].
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which was formulated that their legal status could not be in contradiction with 
the constitutional order of Croatia as a unitary and indivisible state. Also, the 
autonomy was limited with the condition of protection for the non-Serbian 
population, retaining the authority of state institutions in some departments, 
authorities of local police in matters of public order and safety, traffic safety 
and alike. It was foreseen that the law came into force immediately but some 
of its regulations would be implemented after the reinstatement of permanent 
peace and after the free local elections were held. Such constitutional law was 
accepted by Sabor on December 4, 1991.9
In the beginning it seemed like Zagreb had managed to find a middle 
ground between EC pressure and domestic public opinion (due to which the 
ruling Croatian Democratic Community abandoned the bill that anticipated 
the establishment of two autonomous counties of absolute Serbian majority 
territories10), understandably not in favor of  a particular tendency for the 
Serbian minority. On the one hand, the law was of constitutional i.e. the high-
est-ranking character, which confirmed Croatia’s readiness for the highest 
standards of minority rights protection. On the other hand, it allowed for 
the integration of municipalities with special autonomous status into wider 
communities, so to say, some sort of regional autonomy with extended scopes 
of authority in self-governmental affairs of non-political character (such as 
spatial development, cherishing and promoting economic strong points, pro-
tection of nature and cultural monuments, attaining the public order and 
peace and safety of traffic) along with the right to international supervision. 
Although he was not completely satisfied with the fact that Zagreb did not 
comply to the request for regional autonomy of political character (i.e. special 
territorial unit which would consist of more municipalities with absolute Ser-
bian majority) and its demilitarization, the German expert for constitutional 
law, who participated in the drafting of the law, reviewed it as suitable at the 
level of the existing minority rights protection elsewhere in Europe. Moreover, 
in some aspects, it went even further than similar solutions elsewhere.11 Not-
withstanding, it became clear in a short period of time, that additional effort 
in “constructive cooperation” is requested from Zagreb.
9 Hrvatski sabor (Croatian Parliament - HS), Zagreb, Sabor Republike Hrvatske (The Parliament 
of the Republic of Croatia - SRH), Zajednička sjednica svih vijeća, Odluka od 4. prosinca 1991. [Joint 
Session of All Councils, Decision of December 4, 1991].
10 HS, SRH, Vlada Republike Hrvatske, Radni tekst od 17. studenog 1991. [Government of the 
Republic of Croatia, Working text of 17 November 1991]
11 G.-H. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, p. 130.
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Indulgence to “Progressive Pressure” – Constitutional Law of May 
1992
Thus, Zagreb evaluated beyond doubt that it managed to outwit the inter-
national community because neither one of the successor states of the former 
Yugoslavia had passed such an advanced law on protection of minority rights. 
Besides, the law had a constitutional character and enabled emphasized terri-
torial autonomy (municipalities) with the possibility of practical regional inte-
gration. Furthermore, the weight of political responsibility was shifted to Knin 
and, indirectly, to Belgrade since the rebelled Serbs controlled the area which 
it was supposed to apply to, while Serbia refused to negotiate on the principles 
of Conference upon which it was formulated. Therefore, Tuđman’s disbelief 
must have been visible when the Conference’s chairman Lord Carrington con-
fronted him as early as mid-December 1991 with extensive remarks (in total, 
12 points of discrepancies between the law and the Conference’s opinion).12
In January 1992, the EC expressed its dissatisfaction with the document of 
special Conference’s institution, the Opinion No. 5 of the Arbitrary Commis-
sion, which was requested to give an opinion on the question whether Croatia 
(together with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Slovenia) fulfilled the 
conditions for international recognition. Having concluded that Macedonia 
and Slovenia fulfil the given terms “in full”, and Bosnia and Herzegovina did 
not, the Commission gave Croatia a conditional passing grade or a “condition-
al yes”. The conclusion of the opinion regarding Croatia was as follows:
“Constitutional law of 4 December 1991 does not include entirely all the stip-
ulations of the Conference bill from 4 November 1991 [i.e. reformed peace 
proposal], especially not the ones referred to in Article 2c, paragraph II, under 
the title of “special position”; therefore it is necessary that the authorities of the 
Republic of Croatia amend the Constitutional Law of 4 December 1991 in such 
a manner so as to comply with these regulations; and with this reservation, the 
Republic of Croatia fulfils the condition for its recognition from member states 
of the European Community according to the Declaration of Yugoslavia and 
Guidelines for recognition of new states in the Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, which the Council of Ministers of the European Community adopted 
on 16 December 1991.”13
12 G.-H. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, p. 130.
13 Vladimir-Đuro Degan, Hrvatska u međunarodnoj zajednici: Razvitak njezine međunarodno-
pravne osobnosti kroz povijest [Croatia in the International Community: The Development of its Inter-
national Legal Personality Through History] (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 2002), p. 251.
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Perhaps, by additional assurances, Tuđman hoped to avoid the trap of es-
tablishing regional political autonomy for territories with Serbian majority. In 
several letters, he tried to persuade the leaders of the Conference that Croatia 
“has accepted everything” or at best, “has accepted everything in principle” 
and that its Constitution is “in compliance” with the requests of the Confer-
ence in Opinion No. 5 of the Arbitrary Commission. It is possible to charac-
terize his efforts as an attempt to avoid responsibility14, but more precisely, it 
would be defined as an attempt of forcing his own commentary regarding the 
matter of the “special status territory“, contrary to the one of the Conference, 
which led to extortion of the widest political autonomy for Serbs in Croatia. 
International recognition of Croatia on January 15, 1992 strengthened this 
belief furthermore.
On February 22, 1992, it became apparent that Zagreb will have to make 
a further effort in “constructive cooperation” when the EC council of minis-
ters sent a letter to Tuđman, requesting the amendment of the Constitutional 
law from December last year. From the expert analysis of the letter, which, in 
fact, consisted of objections with propositions for further possible elaboration 
of the matter, it was evident that the EC was still against the idea of border 
changes by the principle of force (so that any form of Serbian autonomy will 
exist within Croatian borders), the special status regime did not apply to terri-
tories beyond 11 municipalities defined by Constitutional law (therefore, Ser-
bian autonomy was out of the question for the territories of Western or Eastern 
Slavonia), but at least due to these objections, the process did not lead to the 
establishment of any federal units within Croatia, specially the establishment 
of any confederate alliance of potential Serbian political autonomy with the 
rest of the Croatian state. The establishment of regional political autonomy for 
the territories with Serbian majority remained the key problem. There was no 
doubt that the EC insisted on the establishment of autonomy of regional char-
acter, whereby it could be concluded that its negotiators are more in favor of 
the idea of creation of two districts with autonomous status which would com-
prise 11 aforementioned municipalities with special status, than establishment 
of separate counties with Serbian majority. If, in the end, the introduction of 
the county system in Croatia would take place, then the aforementioned dis-
tricts should become separate counties (or, in case of merging, one county). 
As the finalization of negotiations regarding the deployment of the UN peace 
forces in Croatia took place simultaneously, the EC representatives strongly 
insisted on demilitarization (disarmament and “arms cleaning”) of territories 
14 Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks: Diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata 1990.-1997. [Croatian 
Phoenix: Diplomatic Processes Behind Closed Doors 1990-1997] (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 
2000), p. 142 – 143.
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foreseen for regional autonomy.15 According to available documentation, we 
might conclude that the EC decided to insist on the establishment of autono-
mous districts, considering the establishment of regional political autonomy as 
the most important question. On the other hand, Zagreb succeeded in denying 
the requests for demilitarization of this area and did not succumb to requests 
for expansion of self-governmental powers for autonomous districts. 
At the beginning of May 1992, the outlines of the compromise between 
Zagreb and the EC became apparent. Under the Law on the Amendments of 
the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of 
Ethnic and National Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, 
which the legislative commission of the Croatian Diet put into further pro-
cedure, the fundamental amendment consisted of introduction of the spe-
cial autonomy status on the regional and not municipal level. Two districts 
obtained such special self-governmental status, on the grounds of the 1981 
census. These were the districts of Glina and Knin. The district of Glina con-
sisted of the municipalities of Glina, Vrginmost, Hrvatska Kostajnica, Dvor na 
Uni and Vojnić. The district of Knin consisted of the municipalities of Knin, 
Obrovac, Benkovac, Gračac, Titova Korenica and Donji Lapac. The districts 
had a right to a special status and autonomous powers identical to the powers 
attributed to former municipalities with a special status. Their structure could 
not be in collision with the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia, 
which defines it as a unitary and indivisible state, so the Croatian govern-
ment retained the right of confirming the election of the district assembly’s 
president and Constitutional court, the right to initiate the legal procedure to 
establish the constitutionality and legality of acts proclaimed by the district’s 
assembly. The proposition implicated that Croatia would conclude a special 
international treaty for the supervision of its stipulations. Sabor adopted the 
new Constitutional law on amendments of the Constitutional Law on Hu-
man Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of Ethnic and National Communi-
ties or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, with only a few votes against it, 
on its joint session on May 7, 1992.16
15 Zbirka Vladimira Šeksa (The collection of Vladimir Šeks - ZVŠ), Zagreb, Vladimir-Đuro Degan, 
Bilješka od 25. veljače 1992. [Vladimir-Đuro Degan, Note of  February 25, 1992]; ZVŠ, Vladimir-
Đuro Degan, Bilješka od 21. ožujka 1992. [Vladimir-Đuro Degan, Note of March 21, 1992]; ZVŠ, 
Vladimir-Đuro Degan, Bilješka od 3. svibnja 1992. [Vladimir-Đuro Degan, Note of May 3, 1992]
16 Izvješća hrvatskog Sabora, 3 (1992), No. 64: 16 – 20.
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Concluding remarks
Considering the above-stated, a few additional questions deserve closer 
attention. First and foremost, the international community viewed the Serbian 
question undoubtedly as a question of crucial importance in Croatia. But, in-
stead of recognizing that the main cause of the conflict is the support given to 
Belgrade by a part of the Croatian Serbs in the creation of the all-Serbian state, 
which caused the war in Croatia from the second half of 1991, influential cir-
cles of some European countries and the EC as a whole (followed by the USA 
and UN) concluded that there are allegedly justifiable reasons for believing 
that Serbs in Croatia are endangered. Such a tendency to request amendments 
to the minority legislation from Croatia was clearly visible even before the 
Conference started. For instance, in the words of Van den Broek addressed to 
the Serbian representative in the federal presidency, Borislav Jović, during the 
first mediation efforts of the EC foreign ministers trio (June – July 1991), the 
essential important difference existed between the situation in Slovenia and 
Croatia. “It is a different kind of problem”, van den Broek stated: “We know 
the history of Croatia. We know the fate of Serbs in Croatia [in the Second 
World War]”.17 Inaccurate comprehension of a well-identified problem led to 
pointing the finger to the wrong target (which materialized in the form of 
strong pressure). Surely, the decision to force Croatia to make substantial con-
cessions in the question of minority legislation was based partly on the false 
understanding that Serbs in Croatia are endangered, thus in a need for alleged 
further protection. 
The EC exposed Croatia to a strong pressure for minority legislation 
changes in the early autumn of 1991. Demanding concessions from (at the 
time being) the weaker side of the conflict was noticeable in other occasions as 
well. Therefore, Genscher, in a letter to Tuđman from January 3, 1992, aimed 
for the same sort of pressure as in November 1991 when he asked the Croatian 
President for “constructive cooperation” in the question of minority legislation 
amendment at the same time when the first serious doubts from Zagreb about 
the benefits of accepting the Vance plan to deploy the UN peace forces started 
to surface, and especially that illegal rebel power structures would continue 
with their work and that the Blue Helmets static activity would open the pos-
sibility of Cypriszation of Croatia, i.e. permanent secession of occupied territo-
ries. “Croatian refusal”, wrote Genscher, “would be understood as downplay of 
a promise given to obtain international recognition”.18 Perhaps pressuring the 
weaker side might be the easier way to the projected goal (might as well be de-
17 Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ [The last days of SFRY] (Kragujevac: Prizma, 1996.), p. 357.
18 M. Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 251.
155
Review of Croatian History 16/2020, no. 1, 145-158
fined as a blackmail), which besides having a clearly defined imperative under 
which everything had to be subdued (international recognition), but then the 
price that the EC had to pay due to aforementioned failure was much higher 
than it had to be (the growing dissatisfaction of Zagreb with the international 
community’s inefficiency and foremost, the failure to stop the armed conflict).
The motives of the EC’s key factors, which strongly demanded the amend-
ments to the minority legislation from Zagreb, were surely not inherent. When 
it comes to Germany, the answer is somewhere between self-interest, noble 
intentions and in some aspects, inaccurate understanding of the situation. As 
Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, a German legal expert and head of the special task 
force of the Conference for minority matters wrote in his memoirs, Bonn man-
aged to persuade Tuđman to change his original policy if he did not want 
to jeopardize the road to Croatia’s independence: instead of “doing nothing 
more for his Serbs than the Serbian President Milošević for his Albanians”, 
in the end he had to take an additional step.19 We believe that a sense of cer-
tain idealism should be recognized in the words mentioned above. It could be 
presumed that Bonn insisted on additional efforts from Zagreb, because the 
perception that Croatia is a German client-state started to hinder its endeavor 
for international recognition (other European states, unwilling to recognize 
Croatia, started to reproach Germany in this question respectively). Of all 
great European states, Germany undoubtably and most honestly believed in 
the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. More precisely, Ahrens 
was the person who made the proposition that included the establishment 
of wide-scope autonomies for all minority communities on the territory of 
former Yugoslavia as early as at the beginning of October 1991, as a part of 
an integral peace proposal, presented to the public a couple of days later by 
Carrington. Afterwards, he insisted most vigorously to apply it elsewhere, but 
with no success. Germany’s influence on Croatia’s decision to compose new 
minority legislation in November 1991 was crucial,20 while Ahrens took part 
as a chief negotiator on behalf of the Conference.
The British Carrington, the chairman of the Conference at the time of 
aforementioned events, started to demand that all the participants of the crises 
and conflict agree upon establishment of a wide-scope regional autonomy with 
political character very early, as an important part of entire peace process. 
Zagreb had to give this privilege to its Serbs and Belgrade to Hungarians and 
19 G.-H. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, p. 129.
20 Michael Libal, Njemačka politika i jugoslavenska kriza 1991. – 1992. (Zagreb: Golden Marketing 
– Tehnička knjiga, 2004) [Originally published in English under the title Limits of Persuasion: Germany 
and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992], p. 187.
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Muslims.21 Nevertheless, the British politicians, including Carrington, stopped 
insisting on implementing the concept of regional political autonomy to all 
crises-affected areas consistently, so one British member of the task force led 
by Ahrens was the author of the proposal to apply the special status regulation 
only to the Serbs in Croatia, but not to Albanians in Kosovo.22 Shortly after 
the proclamation of the Constitutional Law of December 1991, Carrington 
demanded change of the concept of autonomies from municipalities with spe-
cial statuses to regions with special statuses, their demilitarization and the 
diminution of central power authorities in relation to the autonomous ones. 
The question of the Republic of Serbian Krajina or the Croatian state territo-
ries under the control of the rebels, would become a central question of the 
entire conflict for Carrington and, without its solution, he did not visualize 
the possibility of integral peaceful resolution.23 For this reason, probably it 
is possible to recognize in his acts the start of pro-Serbian policy in some 
international communities’ circles, under which only a policy of concessions 
to Belgrade can lead to his détente, therefore peace. In the case of Croatia, it 
meant that only the final solution of the Knin problem could lead to the start 
of the process of resolving the Albanian problem in Kosovo and Hungarian 
matter in Vojvodina. 
Finally, there is still the answer to the question of the justification of entire 
enterprise. In May 1992, one of the youngest states on the European continent, 
the Republic of Croatia, could indeed be proud, as Ahrens put it, “of her ex-
ample of progressive legislation, minorities in other states could only dream 
off”.24 But, it didn’t bring it any closer to the resolution of the conflict at all. 
Firstly, because the rebelled Serbs were not interested in any kind of a level of 
rights in Croatia and this was the opinion of Belgrade as well. It is interesting 
to notice in fact that Serbia, contrary to Zagreb, persistently declined even the 
conversations regarding thespecial status of Serbs in Croatia. When it was 
necessary, as in October 1991, when faced with the question of proposal for a 
peaceful resolution, Milošević acted as if he was interested in the “resolution 
sui generis for Serbs [in Croatia]”, which might indicate the possibility of the 
special status, or when in the second half of November of the same year he 
declared that the proposal of the special status is “fine in some elements and 
in others it isn’t, or it is inconclusive”, only to start the work on drawing the 
UN forces in and on his concept of separation of conflicted parties, but clearly 
without recognition of Croatia in the outlines of her internationally recog-
21 HR-HDA-1741, London/Antun Pinterović: Informacija od 20. rujna 1991. [London/Antun 
Pinterović: Information from September 20, 1991].
22 G.-H. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, pp. 97 – 98.
23 G.-H. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, p. 69.
24 G.-H. Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge, p. 139.
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nized borders.25 In fact, Milošević only left the impression of being interested 
in the special status project, deliberately working on stalling the Republic of 
Serbian Krajina issue in order to achieve his real objective, i.e. the annexation 
of these territories to Serbia. Unwillingness of Belgrade to even consider the 
possibility of autonomy for Serbs within the Croatian borders thus made the 
enormous effort put in by the EC completely purposeless. 
It is important to point out the fact Croatia has never been put in the 
situation to apply the constitutional laws for minorities from December 1991 
and May 1992 in practice. Since the main part of these areas was under the 
control of the rebelled Serbs and the international community was not able to 
force them to concessions, the promises of the Croatian authorities were never 
put to the test. It could be concluded that Zagreb was ready to allow a certain 
variant of “reasonable autonomy” for Serbs, but not more than that. This way, 
amid persistent rejections from Knin and Serbia for a functional negotiating 
process and multiple inaptitude demonstrated by the international communi-
ty, when the first opportunity arose, Zagreb decided to throw away the burden 
of “reasonable collaboration”. After the liberation of the occupied territories of 
Banovina, Kordun, Lika and Northern and Middle Dalmatia at the beginning 
of August 1995, Sabor suspended parts of the Constitutional Law from May 
1992, which stipulated the establishment of two autonomous districts.
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